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TO PLEA OR NOT TO PLEA: THE QUESTION
POSED BY FEDERAL RULE 11
Effective July 1, 1966,' Rule I1 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure placed a burden on federal judges to
personally address the defendant to ascertain whether or not he
knowingly, willingly and intelligently waived the constitutional
rights and privileges attendant to a trial by jury when such
defendant entered a plea of guilty. Adoption of the rule stemmed
from a desire to insure fairness and adequacy in accepting a guilty
plea when it was realized that a majority of defendants in the
federal court pleaded guilty and did not proceed to trial.'
There are several underlying reasons for the Rule 11
'
3
requirement that a defendant be personally addressed by the court
when entering a plea of guilty: (1) in order that the* plea reflect
the defendant's own choice he must be aware of the charges and
consequences of his conviction; (2) it is important that the
defendant. realize that the court is concerned with preserving his
rights and in so doing, impress upon the defendant the court's
fairness; and, (3) a record will be provided which will minimize
later claims of error.4
In the recent case of McCarthy v. United States,' the United
States Supreme Court found that Rule I I must be strictly adhered
to since:
[A] defendant who enters such a plea (of guilty) simultaneously
waives several constitutional rights, inclitding his privilege
against compulsory self incrimination, his right to trial by
jury, and his right to confront his accusers. For this waiver to
be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be 'an
I. FED. R. CRIM. P. II.
2. U.S.C.A. RULE II, n.2 (1969).
3. FED. RULE CRI.M. P. I I provides in part:
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such a
plea or plea of Nolo Coniendre without first addressing the defendant
personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the nature of the charge and consequences of the plea. ...
The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied
that there is a factual basis for the plea. (emphasis added)
4. McCarthy v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 1170-71 (1969). See also Hoffman.
Rule /I and the Plea of Guilty. 45 F.R.D. 149 (1967).
5. McCarthy v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 1166 (1969).
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intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege'.
6
Therefore, unless voluntarily made, the guilty plea is void as being
in violation of the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution.7
McCarthy was charged with three counts of willfully and
knowingly attempting to evade tax payments.8 Upon a plea of
guilty to the second count the government dismissed the first and
third counts. McCarthy's counsel represented to the court that he
had explained the charge to his client. Based on this representation
the judge assumed the defendant was aware of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea. During the course of the
trial McCarthy consistently claimed that failure to file was based
on neglect. He appealed on two grounds; the court had not
determined that the plea was entered voluntarily or that there was
a factual basis for the pleaY
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed;
there had been a failure of compliance with Rule 11: The
defendant had not been personally addressed by the court to
determine if his plea had been made voluntarily with an
understanding of the nature of the charges and the consequences
of the plea.
Having decided McCarthy the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the case of Boykin v. Alabama.0 The
6. 89 S. Ct. at 1171. Compare Stanley, Requirements of Rule II and 44 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 45 F.R.D. 149, 158 (1967) (wherein he points out
that compliance with Rule I I is not accomplished by any ritual), with United States v.
Rizzo, 362 F.2d 97, 99 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Jackson, 390 F.2d 130, 135 (7th
Cir. 1968) (a questioning format is laid out in this case that is sufficient to satisfy Rule
I1); Quibell v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 474, 480 (S.D. Cal. 1965) (pointing out that
unless Rule II is complied with at the time of a plea of guilty, or prior thereto, and
compliance is shown in the record, the resulting sentence is not valid); United States ex
rel Crosby v. Brierley, 404 F.2d 790, 793 (3rd Cir. 1968) (a plea of "guilty generally"
disclosed that defendant was asked no questions concerning his understanding of the plea,
the mens rea requirement, or its consequences).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 12. McCarthy, a 65 year old man, had contended at
the trial that his failure to pay the taxes was the result of poor bookkeeping during a period
when he had been suffering with a serious drinking problem. In this situation the mens
rea requirement, "willfully and knowingly" would appear to be absent. Apparently one
of the purposes of Rule I I would be to make it incumbent upon judges to explain the mens
rea requirement to avoid guilty pleas by innocent persons.
9. See text accompanying note 8, supra.
10. Boykin v. Alabama, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969).
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defendant, a Negro male, pleaded guilty to five counts of
common-law robbery while represented by court-appointed
counsel. At the sentence hearing Boykin was sentenced to death,
the maximum penalty for robbery in Alabama." The conviction
was upheld on automatic appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court.'
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was
error for the State Court trial judge to accept a plea of guilty
without an- affirmative showing in the record that the plea was
made voluntarily. This must be accompanied by an understanding
of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. In so
ruling the reasoning of Rule 11 was superimposed on the state
courts. As Mr. Justice Harlan stated in his dissent:
The court thus in effect fastens upon the states, as a matter of
federal constitutional law, the rigid prophylactic requirements
of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.'
3
The McCarthy and Boykin decisions establish the following
as the'federal standard for accepting a guilty plea. The court
must: 1).personally address the accused to insure that he is aware
of the nature of the charge against him and the consequences of
his plea; 2) insure that the plea was entered voluntarily; 3)
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea; and, 4) make
an affirmative showing in the record that the plea was made
voluntarily and with an understanding of the charge and the
penalty.
This Comment will attempt to analyze the procedure used in
California to insure the rights of a defendant who pleads guilty
and the potential impact of the Rule II standard on California
State Courts. This discussion will include the inferential effect
the Boykin decision may have on plea bargaining in the state courts
and any possible trends emanating from McCarthy and Boykin.
11. Alabama provides, "Any person who is convicted of robbery shall be punished,
at the discretion of the jury, by death, or imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less
than ten years." CODE OF ALA.. Tit. 14 § 415 (Michie 1958).
12. Automatic appeal is provided for anyone who receives the death penalty for the
commission of a felony. CODE OF ALA., Tit. 15 § 382 (2) (Michie 1958); see People v.
Boykin, 281 Ala. 659, 207 S.2d 412 (1968), where conviction was upheld on appeal.




California has enacted two statutory safeguards to protect
the interests of the defendant who pleads guilty. California Penal
Code Section 1018 requires that the plea of guilty be made in the
open court,14 and California Penal Code Section 1192 directs the
court to determine the degree of the crime before passing
sentence.'5 California procedure developed through these statutes
and case authority will be compared with the federal standard to
see their similarities or divergences.
In reviewing the cases it appears the standard set in
California for accepting the guilty plea is providing the accused
with counsel, having the plea made in an open court and deciding
on the degree of the crime, if the crime is one that involves
degrees, prior to sentencing. California leaves the accused, on
appeal, with the burden of going forward with the evidence to
show that he was not aware of the consequences of the guilty plea.
He must allege and have the burden of proving (by clear and
convincing evidence) 6 that he was the victim of fraud,.duress,
coercion or an unkept promise. California state courts are not
required to explain to the accused the effects of his guilty plea or
the extent of possible punishment. This duty is left to the attorney.
In People v. Cabral,17 defendant was charged with offering to
sell heroin, conspiring to obtain money by falsely promising to sell
heroin, and, conspiring to cheat and defraud by criminal means.
He was granted permissioin to withdraw his plea of not guilty to
the charge of conspiring to cheat and defraud by criminal means.
Upon entering this plea the other two charges were dropped. On
appeal defendant contended that his plea was the result of fear,
intimidation and false promises and, that he pleaded guilty on the
14. In pertinent part, this section reads as follows: "Unless otherwise provided by
law every plea must be put in by the defendant himself in open court. No plea of guilty
for a felony for which the maximum punishment is death, or life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole, shall be received from a defendant who does not appear with
counsel. ... CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (West 1956).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192 (West 1956), provides:
Upon a plea of guilty, or upon a conviction by the court without a jury, of a
crime distinguished or divided into degrees, the court, must, before passing
sentence, determine the degree. Upon the failure of the court to so determine,
the degree of the crime of which the defendant is guilty, shall be deemed the
lesser degree.
16. People v. Dufford, 163 Cal. App. 2d 673, 329 P.2d 707 (1958).
17. People v. Cabral, 128 Cal. App. 2d 693, 694-95, 275 P.2d 927, 928 (1954).
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advice of his counsel who represented that he would be pleading
guilty to petty theft. There was no showing in the record that
defendant was personally addressed by the court to discern
defendant's awareness of the nature of the charge and the
consequences of his plea.
Again, indicative of California procedure, is the case of
People v. Loeber.18 Defendant was charged with three separate
counts of issuing checks without sufficient funds. Represented by
counsel, he entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged. On
appeal, it was claimed that the deputy district attorney faltered on
a deal.
It is further claimed by the appellant that the court erroneously
failed to admonish him of the consequences of a plea of guilty
and failed to ask him whether any promise, reward or
immunity had been offered or granted. The trial court was not
required to so 'admonish' the appellant or to ask him the
question stated. Furthermore, the record also shows that when
appellant entered his plea he was represented by counsel, who
presumably informed him of the consequences of the plea
entered. 9
Appellant had the burden of proving the plea was involuntary.
In contrast to federal standards the Loeber court places the
burden on counsel to explain the nature and consequences of a
guilty plea to the defendant. The court is not required to admonish
a person of the nature of the charges or the consequences of his
plea. A record is not required to show that appellant was aware
of the nature of the charges and the consequences or that the plea
was entered voluntarily.
In People v. Martinez,2 " appellant was charged with assault
by means of force likely to do great bodily harm. Appellant
requested and received appointed counsel. He subsequently
18. People v. Loeher, 158 Cal. App. 2d 730, 735-36, 323 P.2d 136, 140 (1958), See
also, People v. Jolke, 242 Cal. App. 2d 132, 133, 51 Cal. Rptr. 171, 180 (1965) (defendant
has burden ofproving plea was involuntary); People v. Mendez, 21 Cal. 2d 20, 21, 161 P.2d
929, 930 (1945) (no special admonition need be given concerning guilty plea).
19. People v. Loeber, 158 Cal. App. 2d 730, 735-36, 323 P.2d 136, 140 (1958).
20. People v. Martinez, 154 Cal. App. 2d 233, 234-35, 316 P.2d 14, 15-16 (1957)
See also. People v. Murrary, 247 Cal. App. 2d 730, 731, 56 Cal. Rptr. 21, 24 (1967) (no
need for affirmative showing in the record). The court has also stated that no responsibility
rests on them to see that the accused receives sound advice. People v. Morton, 100 Cal.
App. 2d 269, 270-71, 223 P.2d 259, 260 (1950).
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pleaded guilty to the offense charged. Appellant's arguments on
appeal are especially significant in light of Rule 11.
The only issue raised by this appeal is whether the appellant's
rights to due process of law under section 13, article I of the
state constitution, and Amendment XIV of the Constitution of
the United States were denied to him by the failure of the trial
court to explain to him the effect and meaning of his plea of
guilty and the degree of his crime and the punishment
therefore.
2'
The court, by way of answer stated that due process had been
observed as the record showed that appellant had been represented
by counsel who had requested and had been granted a one week
continuance to discuss a plea.
The court deems due process to be analogous with the
appointment of counsel. This is shown by the court's placement
of the burden of explaining the nature of the plea and its
consequences as well as assuring its voluntariness, upon the
counsel. Federal Rule 11, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court, has clearly placed this burden on the court.
These cases indicate that once an accused pleads guilty and
this plea is accepted, he must prove on appeal that his plea was
the result of fraud, coercion, or an unkept promise22 in order to
justify a new trial.2 Indeed the courts appear to forget the legal
phenomena of plea bargaining and its possible consequences.
THE INFERENTIAL EFFECT RULE 11 MAY HAVE ON PLEA
BARGAINING IN CALIFORNIA STATE COURTS.
Plea bargaining, the process whereby defense counsel
negotiates with the prosecution over crime, plea and punishment,
is an integral part of the criminal judicial process. "[T]he best
estimate is that over 85 percent of all non-federal prosecutors'
offices negotiate to some degree, 'when appropriate', 24 in order to
obtain pleas of guilty. ' 25 Acceptance of guilty pleas and the
21. People v. Martinez, 154 Cal. App. 2d 233, 235, 316 P.2d 14, 16 (1957).
22. For grounds of reversal, see 15 CAL. D. 274 b (West 1959).
23. A Federal District Court Judge, in a personal interview, brought out his belief
that plea bargaining works to the advantage of the guilty client. It provides an opportunity
for a lesser penalty and, because prolonged litigation is dispensed with, it is rehabilitative.
24. There appears to be no criteria set out as to when plea bargaining is appropriate.
25. Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilt v
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process of plea bargaining has attendant problems-those to
which Federal Rule 11 is addressed. Dean Wigmore stated that:
"under certain stresses a person, especially one of defective
mentality or peculiar temperament, may falsely acknowledge
guilt." 6
Though many authors have put forward public policy
arguments in favor of plea bargaining, 27 in a recent article28 it was
pointed out that there is, in actuality, no check on the fairness of
the plea bargaining process as the interests of prosecution and
defense tend to merge.
The prosecutor desires to have the case disposed of by the plea
and the defendant is trying to have his plea accepted ...
There is no adversary check. The court then has difficulty in
discovering and examining the elements underlying the bargain
that may be relevant to fairness. 29
What is needed is a means whereby justice can be enhanced for
the accused.3 1 Checks must be placed on the prosecutor and
defense attorney when negotiating the fate of the accused.
Since the plea bargaining process is underway prior to trial,
Pleas, PENN. L. REV. 856, 901 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Guilty Plea Bargaining:
Compromises].
26. 3 \VIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940) states:
There has been no careful collection of statistics of untrue confessions, nor has
any great number of instances been even loosely reported, but enough have
been verified to fortify the conclusion, based on ordinary observation of human
conduct, that under certain stresses a person, especially one of defective
mentality or peculiar temperament, may falsely acknowledge guilt. This
possibility arises wherever the innocent person is placed in such a situation that
the untrue acknowledgment of guilt is at the time more promising of two
alternatives between which he is obliged to choose; that is, he chooses any risk
there may be in falsely acknowledging guilt, in preference to some worse
alternative associated with silence.
See also Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385, 393
(1951) (it is stated that people have pleaded guilty to a lesser charge out of fear of being
railroaded to the penitentiary for a long period of years); Comment, The Influence of the
Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L. J. 204, 220 (1957)
("The greatest danger inherent in the policy of utilizing the [guilty] plea as a factor in
sentencing is that innocent men will be influenced to plead guilty. .' . . A defendant may
be especially reluctant to plead not guilty when he has a criminal record, for then his
chances of successfully establishing innocence are greatly diminished.").
27. See e.g.. Fay, Bargained for Guilty Plea, 4 CRII. LAW BULL. 265 (1968).
28. Folberg, "Bargained For" Guilty Plea-An Evaluation, 4 CRIM. LAW BULL.
201, 204 (1968); see also Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises at 866.
29. Folberg, "Bargained For" Guilty Plea-An Evaluation. 4 CRi,%. LAW BULL.
201,204 (1968).




the District Attorney is left unhampered in bringing as many
charges as he feels are appropriate. With subtle pressure the
merging of interests is then underway to have the accused plead
to a lesser, albeit, non-existent charge to relieve himself from the
possible conviction of a greater charge. For an ex-felon whose past
can be brought into court for impeachment purposes-this
becomes a dubious right.3' The only limiting factor, aside from the
exceptions stipulated in the code, is that when the evidence is
introduced it must be done in good faith.3 2 In balancing the
probability of the jury believing him, notwithstanding his
conviction record, the ex-felon, faced with circumstances that he
believes might require him to take the stand, might well throw up
his hands and go for the bargain.
The superimposition of Rule 11 on the California courts
would ovrrule California case precedent relating to the burden of
proving whether or not defendant understood the nature of the
charges against him. It would clearly place this burden on the
judge. Practically speaking, the result would be to assure the
defendant of a trial by the judge in that he must satisfy himself
that there is a factual basis for the plea before sentencing. This
procedural safeguard attempts to eliminate the possiblity of an
innocent person being convicted.3 3 Additionally, the accused must
understand the consequences of the plea which would directly
affect California's statutory law. The requirement in Penal Code
Section 1192 that a person be made aware of the degree of the
crime, where the crime is one involving degrees, before sentencing
would be obsolete. Not only would the accused have to know the
degree of the crime, if degrees be involved, but he must be aware
of the consequences of his plea in every instance. This is, in
essence, saying that the particular mens rea requirement must be
explained by the judge to the accused and understood by him or
his counsel before the plea is entered. The judge would be in a
31. Prior felony convictions, for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
may be shown by the examination of the witness or by the record of the judgment that he
has been convicted of a felony. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1966).
32. People v. Perez, 58 Cal. 2d 229, 237-38, 373 P.2d 617, 621 (1962).
33. As a matter of pressing current concern, it is conceivable that with increased
urban unrest, coupled with incidents between citizens with police, what would normally be
considered curiosity might end up being charged as obstructing a police officer while
making an arrest, inciting to riot, failure to disperse or resisting arrest.
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position to discern and convey to the defendant whether or not the
plea bargaining has been realistic. If, after examining the major
elements of the crime, the accused perceives that he is receiving
no bargain he may proceed to trial.
Rule 11 is not a panacea. For example, if prior to trial,
bargaining has taken place and the initial charge has been dropped
or modified, the judge will not be in a position to evaluate the
elements of the initial crime, and the potential impact of Rule 11
is questionable. It seems that the United States Supreme Court
is merely attempting to counteract the potential negative impact
of plea bargaining and hastily arranged guilty pleas. The most
favorable prognosis for the rule is that the accused will be aware
of what he is faced with in terms of charges and possible
sentences. It .is only in that manner that it will have impact on
the actual bargaining process though statutory and case authority
would be overruled. The subtle pressures that lend one to give into
the plea bargaining process (multiplicity of charges 34 a chance for
leniency if one pleads guilty, or, a rougher penalty if you force the
court into a regular trial) 5 remain unchecked.
CONCLUSION
In substance, the accused must intelligently and knowingly
plead guilty. Nevertheless the application of Rule II is not a
solution for the obvious hazards of the plea bargaining process:
innocent men convicted, ex-felons afraid to play the odds and
subtle coercion by judges to have the accused participate in the
bargaining process as a means of efficient and economical
administration.
As long as an ex-felon's record can be introduced into
evidence for the purpose of impeaching his testimony an anomaly
exists. The truth of a person's testimony should be evaluated in
light of the surrounding circumstances. If the purpose for which
we imprison people is to rehabilitate them it seems strange that
this very fact can be used to lend credence to making them a
recidivist. The admission of a prior conviction record is
tantamount to double jeopardy and should be excluded.
34. See note 29, supra, at 205.
35. See e.g.. Comment, The Influence of The Defendants Plea on Judicial
Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 209 (1957).
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It is suggested that there is an efficient method of oyerseeing
the plea bargaining process. To provide the accused with
bargaining leverage, after his preliminary hearing a lay procedure
could be enacted whereby potential charges against the accused
would be evaluated in light of the reasonableness of the facts
surrounding the arrest. Obviously those charges which have no
potential bearing would be precluded from being brought. If this
procedure occurred prior to negotiations with the District
Attorney or even prior to trial, an excellent means would be
provided for alleviating undue pressure on the accused. This subtle
pressure is probably the greatest factor inducing a person to plead
guilty. Moreover, it is commonly recognized" that a sentence is
more lenient if a person pleads guilty, more harsh if he forces the
court to trial. This practice should be recognized, evaluated and
condemned within the constitutional framework of a person's
right to trial by jury-a right which he should not be punished
for exercising.
NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.
36. Comment, Influence of the Defendant's Guilty Plea on Judicial Determination
of Sentence. 66 YALE L.J. 204, 207-09 (1956-57). This article states:
The concessions accorded by prosecutors to a defendant who pleads guilty are
not the only sentencing advantages he may expect to receive. . . . 66 per cent
of the 140 judges replying consider the defendant's plea a relevant factor in
the local sentencing procedure. 87 per cent of the judges who acknowledged
that the plea was germane indicated that a defendant pleading guilty to a crime
was given a more lenient punishment than a defendant who pleaded not guilty.
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